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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Philip Dieter appeals from the order denying his motion to dismiss 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On July 12, 1988, a grand jury indicted Dieter on three charges: lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen, infamous crime against nature, and sexual 
abuse of a child under sixteen. (R. 1, pp.7-8.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Dieter pled guilty to lewd conduct, and the state dismissed the other two charges. 
(R., pp.9-10.) On December 16, 1988, the court entered an order withholding 
judgment and placing Dieter on probation for five years. 2 (See R., pp.1 OA-1 OD 
("Appendix A").) 
On June 1, 1990, Dieter filed a motion to "dissolve" his probation or, 
alternatively, to amend the conditions of his probation. (R., pp.14-17.) The 
parties thereafter stipulated to amend Dieter's probationary terms. (R., pp.18-
23.) One year later, Dieter filed another motion asking to "dissolve" his 
1 All references to the record will be to the augmented record, which includes 
both the original record and the additional pages requested by Dieter. 
2 While the order withholding judgment was signed on December 16, 1998 (R., 
p.10C), and the register of actions indicates it was filed that date (R., p.4A) , for 
reasons which are not clear, the file stamp on the order is January 4, 1989 (R., 
p.10A). For consistency with the pleadings in this case, and because the 
difference in dates is not material for purposes of this appeal, the state will refer 
to the order using the December 16, 1998 date, rather than the January 4, 1989 
date. 
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probation. (R., pp.28-29.) It is unclear whether that motion was ever heard but, 
in any event, it appears the motion was never granted. (See R., p.3.) 
On August 17, 1992, the state filed a motion for a bench warrant for a 
probation violation alleging Dieter violated his probation by (1) having contact 
with minor children without the consent of his probation officer; (2) failing to 
report; (3) failing to submit monthly reports; (4) failing to comply with SANE 
Monitoring Contract; and (5) absconding. (R., pp.35-37.) Notwithstanding the 
state's pending motion alleging he violated the terms of his probation, Dieter filed 
another motion to "dissolve" his probation on September 22, 1992, claiming he 
"ha[d] complied with all requirements of the original and amended probation 
orders and completed approximately four years of the five year term." (R., p.39 
("Appendix B").) There is nothing in the record regarding the disposition of the 
alleged probation violations; however, the record does indicate that on October 9, 
1992, the court entered an order terminating Dieter's probation and withholding 
judgment. (R., pp.59-60 ("Appendix C").) In that order, the court stated Dieter 
had "substantially complied with" his probation a~d, therefore, the court 
"dissolved" the order of probation. (Appendix C (R., p.60).) The order further 
stated: "As a consequence and pursuant to the Order entered December 16, 
1988, the original Judgment and as it was subsequently amended is withheld, 
and the Clerk is appropriate directed to do so." (Appendix C (R., p.60).) 
On September 16, 1999, Dieter filed a motion seeking "[e]xpungement of 
[his] criminal record from the Bureau of Criminal Identification ... pursuant to I.C. 
19-2604." (R., p.61.) The motion specifically asked the court to "expunge[]" and 
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"seal[]" all records in his case. (R., pp.61-62.) The coure denied the motion on 
December 29, 1999. (R., p.68.) 
Nearly eleven years later, on December 14, 2010, Dieter filed a pro se 
motion asking the court to dismiss his case "pursuant to the Orders issued ... on 
December 16, 1988 and on October 9, 1992." (R., p.69.) The court issued a 
"Notice of Intent to Deny Motion to Dismiss" explaining, in relevant part: 
Where a defendant has not complied with terms and conditions of 
probation "at all times," as required by I.C. § 19-2604(1), a district 
court has no authority to grant a motion to dismiss. Id. In addition, 
a movant is required to make a "satisfactory showing," convincing 
the court that it is "compatible with the public interest" that the 
defendant's charges be dismissed. 
Although [Dieter] claims he fully complied with the terms of 
probation, the record does not fully support his assertion. Based on 
the partial records before this Court, it appears that on August 17, 
1992, a Motion and Order for Bench Warrant for PV (probation 
violation) was filed, and a Bench Warrant issued. Although the file 
does not contain the disposition of this Motion, it suggests that 
[Dieter] failed to abide by the terms of his probation. Nevertheless, 
on October 9, 1992, the Court entered an Order Terminating 
Probation and entering the withheld judgment, noting [Dieter] had 
"substantially complied" with the order of probation and withheld 
judgment. 
(R., pp.72-73.) The court concluded that because Dieter failed to make a 
"satisfactory showing that he completed his probation while abiding by the terms 
and conditions of probation at all times, or that dismissal of his charge is in the 
public interest," the motion would be denied. (R., p.73.) The court, however, 
3 The Honorable Robert Newhouse presided over Dieter's case through the order 
terminating his probation entered October 9, 1992. (See generally R., pp.7-60.) 
The Honorable George Carey handled all subsequent proceedings. (See 
generally R., pp.68-165.) 
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gave Dieter 30 days "in which to request an evidentiary hearing or make 
supplementary filings in support of his Motion." (R., p.73.) 
Counsel subsequently appeared on Dieter's behalf and requested an 
evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.75-78.) Dieter, through counsel, also filed a 
"Memorandum" in response to the court's notice. (R., pp.87-90.) In his 
memorandum, Dieter asserted his alleged probation violations were at "issue" 
before the court in 1992 when the court terminated his probation based on the 
affidavit filed in support of the September 22, 1992 Motion to Dissolve Probation 
in which Dieter, and others on his behalf, challenged the allegations, explained 
Dieter's non-compliance, and provided information about Dieter. (R., p.87; see 
also pp.41-58 (affidavits).) Dieter also argued in his memorandum that dismissal 
is in the public interest. (R., pp.88-90.) As a component of his "public interest" 
argument, Dieter noted: 
A new statute has been passed by the Montana Legislature. It 
requires anyone who has a "sex offense" on his record to register 
that offense. Once the registration is made, the person will have 
any license removed and will not be allowed to vote. [Dieter] would 
have his Montana Fish and Game License terminated. He could 
not hunt to provide food for him and his wife. He would not be 
allowed to vote. Equally and no less important, [Dieter's] earned 
reputation as a hardworking Montana citizen would be destroyed. 
This based upon an offense which occurred in 1988. 
(R., p.89.) 
Although the state filed no written response to his memorandum, Dieter 
filed a "Response to Prosecutor" in which he responded to the prosecutor's off-
the-record assertion that the issue before the court was governed by the Sexual 
Offender Registration and Notification Community Right to Know Act ("SORNA"), 
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and more specifically, I.C. § 18-8310. (R., p.97; Tr., p.45, Ls.6-24.) With respect 
to the application of that statute, Dieter asserted the provisions of SORNA did not 
apply because the original judgment entered in his case in 1988 predated the 
enactment of SORNA. (R., pp.97-98.) Dieter further asserted that I.C. § 19-
2604(3) did not apply because it "did not exist" at the time judgment was entered 
in December 1988; as such, Dieter argued, "Judge Newhouse properly entered 
his order based upon Section 19-2604(1)." (R., p.98.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed that SORNA did not apply to 
Dieter's case "because the order withholding judgment was entered prior to July 
1,1993." (Tr., p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.14; see R., p.125.) At the conclusion of the 
hearing Dieter asked the court to either "expunge" his case so he would not 
"have to go back into trying to interpret the nuances in Montana law" or to 
dismiss his case. (Tr., p.48, L.20 - p.49, L.6.) The court thereafter entered an 
order denying Dieter's motion to dismiss, concluding dismissal was not in the 
public interest. (R., pp.124-127.) Dieter filed a motion to reconsider (R., pp.130-




Dieter states the issues on appeal as4 : 
1. Does the District Court have the jurisdiction or discretion to 
amend or modify the final orders entered by the original 
District Court in 1988, 1990, and 1992? 
2. Must the District Court comply with the mandatory dismissal 
orders of the original District Court? 
3. Did the District Court err in refusing to grant the Appellant's 
motion for dismissal? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Dieter failed to establish that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
deny his motion to dismiss or that the court otherwise erred in denying the 
motion? 
4 Although not stated as an issue on appeal, the body of Dieter's brief includes 
an argument that SORNA does not apply to his case. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) 
The state submits this argument is not relevant to the issues on appeal. Not only 
did the state concede below that SORNA had no application, there is no 
indication that Dieter has been required to register as a sex offender in Idaho, 
and his registration status has no bearing on whether the district court had 
authority to dismiss his case or erred in declining to do so. The state will, 
therefore, not address this argument beyond this footnote. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Deny Dieter's Motion To Dismiss Pursuant 
To I.C. § 19-2604 And Did Not Err In Denying That Motion 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Dieter asserts the district court did not have "jurisdiction or 
discretion to amend or modify the final orders entered by Judge Newhouse in 
1988, 1990 and 1992." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Dieter also asserts that even if 
the court had authority to "amend or modify" Judge Newhouse's orders, it abused 
its discretion in doing so. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Dieter's arguments fail. 
The district court did not amend or modify any of Judge Newhouse's orders 
because whether Dieter was entitled to dismissal of his case was never 
presented to or ruled on by Judge Newhouse. Dieter has therefore failed to 
establish the district court lacked authority to deny his motion to dismiss. Dieter 
has likewise failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review." State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). The appellate court also 
freely reviews the construction and application of a statute. State v. Shock, 133 
Idaho 753, 755, 992 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131 
Idaho 484,485,959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998). 
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C. The District Court Had Authority To Deny Dieter's Motion To Dismiss 
Dieter argues that the district court did not have "jurisdiction or discretion 
to amend or modify the final orders entered by Judge Newhouse in 1988, 1990 
and 1992." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) According to Dieter, this is true because the 
Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, And Entering Order 
Withholding Judgment filed October 9, 1992, effectively dismissed his case 
because the original judgment entered on December 16, 1998, contemplated 
future dismissal.5 (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) This argument fails as a matter 
of fact and as a matter of law. 
At all times relevant to this appeal, Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) provided6: 
If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence 
has been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon 
satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times complied 
with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on 
probation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that 
there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and 
if it be compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or 
set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and 
finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant; and this shall 
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and 
granted probation by the court before this law goes into effect, as 
well as to cases which arise thereafter. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (3), Judge Newhouse originally entered an 
order withholding judgment and placing Dieter on probation for five years. 
(Appendix A (R., pp.1 OA-1 OC).) The final paragraph of that order states: 
5 If, as Dieter asserts, his case was dismissed by Judge Newhouse in 1992, it is 
unclear why he needed to seek dismissal again in 2010. Nevertheless, the state 
will address the merits of his arguments on appeal. 
6 Effective July 1, 2011, I.C. § 19-2604(1) was amended to allow a district court 
to grant relief under this section even if the defendant did not at all times comply 
with the terms and conditions of probation. 
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AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the expiration of the 
period of this order withholding judgment, or the earlier termination 
thereof, and upon written showing by or on behalf of the 
defendant that he has fully complied with the terms of his 
probation, then, and, in that event, this action shall be dismissed. 
(Appendix A (R., p.10C) (emphasis added).) 
On September 22, 1992, Dieter filed a "Motion To Dissolve Probation," 
which states: 
This Motion is based upon the fact that [Dieter] has complied with 
all requirements of the original and amended probation orders and 
completed approximately four years of the five year term. The 
Probation Officer's admissions in her recommendations that the 
time and expense of supervising the probation status of Mr. Dieter 
warrants ending the probation. Further, that it would be in the best 
interest of both [Dieter] and the State of Idaho that the probation be 
terminated. 
(Appendix B (R., pp.39-40).) 
In response to Dieter's motion, and with the additional information that the 
state had alleged Dieter in fact violated his probation (R., pp.35-37), Judge 
Newhouse entered an "Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order Of 
Probation, And Entering Order Withholding Judgment" on October 9, 1992.7 
(Appendix C (R., pp.59-60).) That order reads, in its entirety: 
This matter came before the Court on October 8, 1992, 
pursuant to the Defendant's Motions [sic]. This matter was 
submitted to the Court based upon the Court file, Affidavits as filed 
on behalf of the Defendant, and following oral argument[8]. Upon 
consideration of same, and good cause appearing, 
7 It appears this order was drafted by counsel for Dieter. (See Appendix C (R., 
p.59).) 
8 Although the order indicates there was oral argument, a transcript of that 
argument is not included in the record. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. This Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and 
order of Probation December 16, 1988, which included that upon 
the expiration of the period of this Order Withholding Judgment or 
the earlier termination thereof, and upon a proper showing of 
compliance by [Dieter], this action would be dismissed. 
2. Approximately four years of the five year probation has 
elapsed and [Dieter] has substantially complied with the said 
Order. 
3. The fifth year of the Order of Probation is terminated. 
4. The Order of Probation as entered and as subsequently 
amended is hereby dissolved. 
5. As a consequence and pursuant to the Order entered 
December 16, 1988, the original Judgment and as it was 
subsequently amended is withheld, and the Clerk is appropriately 
directed to do so. 
6. Nothing herein will prevent the Court from considering 
[Dieter's] record upon sentencing should he be found guilty of any 
subsequent defense. 
(Appendix C (R., pp.59-60) (emphasis added).) 
The plain language of Judge Newhouse's order does not support Dieter's 
claim that his case was dismissed at that time because no form of the word 
"dismiss" appears anywhere in the order; in fact, the order only states that the 
judgment remains withheld. Although Dieter seems to believe dismissal would 
be automatic based on the language of the original judgment, which 
contemplated dismissal if he fully complied with the terms of his probation, he 
cites no authority for such a proposition, and the state is aware of none. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) To the contrary, the original judgment itself required 
Dieter to make a written showing in support of dismissal, which is consistent with 
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the statute's requirement that the defendant make an "application" for dismissal. 
I.C. § 19-2604(1). Further, while Dieter made an "application," his application did 
not actually request dismissal; it only requested termination of his probation. 
(Appendix B (R., pp.39-40).) This limitation on his request is understandable 
given that he did not fully comply with the terms of his probation as required by 
both the original judgment and I.C. § 19-2604(1). 
Dieter's failure to fully comply with the terms of his probation is also 
consistent with Judge Newhouse's finding that he only "substantially complied" 
and is consistent with the conclusion that Judge Newhouse did not dismiss his 
case. Any other reading of Judge Newhouse's 1992 order would be contrary to 
the actual language of the order, and would also be contrary to law. As 
explained in State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 487, 959 P.2d 465, 468 (Ct. 
App. 1998): 
[W]e conclude that I.C. § 19-2604(1) clearly and unambiguously 
states that a defendant cannot have his or her guilty plea set aside 
if he or she has violated the terms of probation. The applicable 
language of the statute states that the court may set aside a guilty 
plea if "the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and 
conditions upon which he as placed on probation." (Emphasis 
added.) This language establishes a condition which must be 
fulfilled before the guilty plea may be set aside. The statute does 
not permit any exception. The plain meaning of the statute is that 
the defendant must at all times comply with the terms of probation; 
otherwise, the district court does not have the necessary statutory 
authority to expunge the record and restore the defendant's civil 
rights. 
(Emphasis original.) This limitation on the authority provided in I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
exists even if there has not been an adjudicated probation violation. State v. 
Hanes, 137 Idaho 40,42,44 P.3d 295, 297 (Ct. App. 2002). Once a defendant 
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moves for relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1), the state is free to assert, regardless of 
a lack of any prior allegations, that the defendant did not at all times compy with 
the terms of his probation, and the defendant must bring forth evidence of 
compliance. !s.L In this case, the state clearly alleged Dieter did not, at all times, 
comply with the terms of his probation. (R., pp.35-37.) Although Dieter 
explained, by affidavit, the reasons for his non-compliance and refuted some of 
the allegations (R., pp.41-45, 51-56), the fact remains that he was not "at all 
times" in compliance with the terms of his probation and Judge Newhouse's 
finding that Dieter only "substantially complied" confirms that he did not "fully" or 
"at all times" comply. As a result, while Judge Newhouse certainly could 
terminate Dieter's probation, he could not dismiss Dieter's case pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2604(1). Schumacher, 131 Idaho at 487,959 P.2d at 468; Hanes, 137 Idaho 
at 42,44 P.3d at 297. Dieter's contrary reading of Judge Newhouse's October 9, 
1992 order is contrary to the facts and the law. 
Because Judge Newhouse never dismissed Dieter's case, the district 
court had authority to consider Dieter's 2010 motion to dismiss, and doing so did 
not result in any amendment to or modification of any of Judge Newhouse's prior 
orders. Dieter's assertion otherwise fails. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Dieter's Motion To Dismiss 
Dieter argues that even if the district court had authority to deny his motion 
to dismiss, it erred in doing so. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Dieter's primary 
assertion in support of this argument is that Judge Newhouse reached a contrary 
conclusion when he decided to terminate Dieter's probation. (Appellant's Brief, 
12 
pp.13-14.) Judge Newhouse's decision to terminate Dieter's probation early is, 
however, irrelevant to whether Dieter is entitled to dismissal of his case. The 
only portion of Judge Newhouse's prior order that is relevant, and would qualify 
as "law of the case," as noted by Dieter and as found by the district court9 , is the 
finding that Dieter only "substantially complied" with his probation, which 
precludes relief regardless of whether dismissal would otherwise be "compatible 
with the public interest." I.C. § 19-2604(1). 
Even if a finding of only substantial compliance was sufficient for relief 
under I.C. § 19-2604(1) or even if the record could be interpreted as supporting 
Dieter's claim of full compliance, the district court was well within its discretion to 
nevertheless deny Dieter's motion to dismiss. Dieter claims otherwise, asserting 
the district court's public interest analysis was based solely on his guilty plea. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This claim is unsupported by the record. In considering 
the public interest, the court stated: 
Balanced against [Dieter's] good record in the past twenty-
plus years is the fact that the defendant took advantage of a 
vulnerable fifteen-year-old girl who was sixteen years his junior. 
Furthermore Dr. Engle's psychosexual evaluation, which was 
prepared for the court's use in sentencing and is part of the court 
record in this case, noted that "Mr. Dieter received scores indicating 
that he had been frankly dishonest about his sexually deviant 
9 Dieter notes that the district court "made an independent finding that [he] had 
met the conditions of his probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) While the district 
court stated Dieter "appears to have complied with his conditions of probation" 
(R., p.126), the court also concluded Judge Newhouse's finding that Dieter only 
"substantially complied" was "necessarily ... the law of the case" (R., p.125). To 
the extent the court's comment that Dieter "appears to have complied with his 
conditions of probation" can be viewed as a "finding," rather than a restatement 
of the conclusion that Dieter only substantially complied, it is not tantamount to a 
finding that Dieter "at all times" complied with his probation, and any such finding 
would be contrary to the record. (See Tr., p.18, L.3 - p.20, L.23.) 
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interests." Dr. Engle also noted that "Mr. Dieter indicated a 
complete lack of motivation towards treatment focused upon the 
rehabilitation of sexual offenders." 
(R., p.126.) 
The court also noted Dr. Engle's conclusion that "Mr. Dieter is at risk for 
further instances of sexual misbehavior with minor girls should the opportunity 
present itself' and Dr. Engle's impression that Dieter's expression of remorse 
was "a superficial attempt to place himself in the best light" because Dieter was 
"unable to identify any possible harm which he might have done to his victim, and 
seemed quite surprised that the examiner would take such a question seriously." 
(R., p.126.) While the district court concluded "[t]he public interest requires the 
continued protection afforded by the original guilty plea" (R., p.127), Dieter's 
assertion that the court's refusal to dismiss his case was predicated solely upon 
the guilty plea is without merit. Dieter has failed to establish the district court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Dieter's motion to 
dismiss. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 2011. 
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JAN 4 1989 ! 
" t<fmr;111~t1J-
Case No. 153111 PUT¥ ,' 
ORDER WITHHOLDING JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
WHEREAS, on the 22nd day of July, 1988, Philip Dieter 
















of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada, 
and charged with the crimes of I : Lewd Conduct With A Minor 
Under Sixteen, Felony, I.C. §18-1508; II: Infamous Crime 
Against nature, Felony, I.C. §18-6605i and III: Sexual Abuse 
Of A Child Under The Age Of Sixteen Years, Felony, I.C . 
§18-1505, committed on or between August, 1986 and October, 
1987, 
AND WHEREAS, through due process of law, the defendant, 
Philip Dieter, plead guilty to said crime of I: Lewd Conduct 
With A Minor Under Sixteen, Felony, I.C. §18-1508, and 
requested probation from the Dis t rict Court, 
_~ WHEREAS, the District Court, having ascertained the 
1 
I: i [lesirability of granting this petition of probation, does 
I 


























. I] -I 
II 
• • 
j judgment is hereby withheld for a period of 5 years, under the ,. 
I! follo~ling conditions, to-wit: 
Ii 1. That the probation is granted to and accepted by the 
II 
probationer. subject to all its terms and conditions, and with 
the understanding that the court may, at any time, in case of 
the violation of the terms of the probation, cause the 
/)
probationer to be returned to the court for the imposition of 
sentence as prescribed by law, or any other punishment as the 
Ii court may see fit to hand down. 
:1 2. That the probationer shall be under the legal custody 
!I and control of the Director of Probation and Parole of the 
State of Idaho and the District Court and suoject to the rules 
of probation as prescribed by the Board of Correction and tbe 
District Court. 
3. Special Conditions. to-wit: 
1. The probationer does bereby agree and consent to the 
search of his person, automobile, real property, and any other 
property, at any time. and at any place. by any law 
enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer. and 
does waive his constitutional rights to be free from such 
I searches. 
~i 2 . The probatioDer shall complete any training or 
! counse1tng program established by the probation officer. 
:1 3. The probationer shall pay $13.50 court costs, $3.00 
, P.C.S.T. fees. and $20.00 fine for Victims' Compensation Fund, 
I in such lJlB.nner as shall be established by the probation 
j officer. 
1 4. The probationer shall contribute such monthly sl1m for 
./ probatioD supervisions as shall be established by the Idaho 
'I State Board of Correction. (20-225 I.C.) 
1 
i 
5. The probatIoner shall have no contact vith any minor 
children or the victim, until she turns 18 years of age, 
without the consent of his probation offIcer . , 
I
!, 6. The probationer shall return all photographs or 
negatives of the victim to the victim. 
II 7. The probationer shall pay cost of victim's counseling. 
I. 8. The probationer shall serve 30 days '0 the Ada County 
'I Jail ~ith workout privileges as shall be set by his prohation 
j
i- Officer. He is to receive credit for 1 day served prior :0 














4. THAT mE PROBATIONER, IF PLACED ON PROBATION TO A 
DESTINATION OUTSIDE THE STATE OF IDAHO, OR LEAVES THE CONFINES 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, WITH OR WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE 
DIRECTOR OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, DOES HEREBY WAIVE 
EXTRADITION TO THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND ALSO AGREES THAT THE 
PROBATIONER WILL NOT CONTEST ANY EFFOBT BY ANY STATE TO RETURN 
THE PROBATIONER TO THE S1'ATE OF IDAHO. 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the expira iO[1 of the 
period of this order withholding judgment, or the earlier 
termination thereof, and upon wr'tteo showing by or on behalf 
of the defendant that he has fully complied with the erms of 
his probation, then, and. in that event. this action shall be 
dismissed, 
Dated this 16th day of Decemb~9. . ... .r/.. 
I tdA7i1 . • J~~ 
BERT G. NEW}{ 
District Judge 
14 z Copies: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
15 Chris Bray 













Christopher D. Bray 
HYDE, WETHERELL, BRAY & HAFF 
(~hee Plaza - suite 500 
1109 Main street 







Attorneys for the Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 

















Case No. 15317 
MOTION TO DISSOLVE 
PROBATION 
COMES NOW The Defendant Philip Dieter by and through his 
clttorney of record, Christopher D. Bray of the firm of Hyde, 
Hetherell, Bray & Haff who respectfully moves this Court to 
dissolve the Probation Order as entered December 16, 1988. This 
Hotion is based upon the fact that the Defendant has complied with 
all requirements of the original and amended probation orders and 
completed approximately four years of the five year term. The 
Probation Officer's admissions in her recommendations that the time 
cmd expense of supervising the probation status of Mr. Dieter 




wnrrants ending the probation. FUrther, that it would be in the 
bf~st interest of both the Defendant and the state of Idaho that the 
probation be terminated. 
DATED this ~ / day of September, 1992. 
HYDE, WETHERELL, BRAY & HAFF 
By ~o~ Christ er D. Bray 
CERTIFICATB OF SBRVICB 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the ~/ day of September, 1992, I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
__ .....-_.HAND DELIVERY 




Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
602 W. Idaho 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Ch~Br(;~ 
nOTION TO DISSOLVE PROBATION - Page 2, (jkp) 
APPENDIXC 
, 
ct.,ristopher D. Bray 
HYDE, WETHERELL, BRAY AND 
~~hee Plaz~ - suite 500 
1109 Mairl street 
P.O. Box 139 
BClise, Idaho 83701 
Te=lephone: (208} 343-1855 
FClcsimile: (208) 343-4800 
At:torneys for Defendant 
HAFF 
~.~~-.~------­/) . r FII.ED 
AJA. :a. ;)S P.M. '----
OCT 9 1992 
J.D 
~--~~~~~~~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 















Case No. 15317 
ORDER TERMINATING PROBATION, 
DISSOLVING ORDER OF PROBATION, 
AND ENTERING ORDER WITHHOLDHm 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court on October 8, 1992, pursuant 
to the Defendant's Motions. This matter was submitted to the Court 
based upon the Court file, Affidavits as filed on behalf of the 
Defendant, and following oral argument. Upon consideration of 
same, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER AS FOLLOWS: 
ORDER TERMINATING PROBATION, DISSOLVING ORDER OF PROBATION, AND 




.. ' ... . ~ -- -
1. This Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and 
Order of Probation December 16, 1988, which included that upon the 
I~xpiration of the period of this order Withholding Judgment or the 
l~arlier termination thereof, and upon a proper showing of 
I:ompliance by the Defendant, this action would be dismissed. 
2. Approximately four years of the five year probation has 
l~lapsed and the Defendant has substantially complied with the said 
I)rder. 
3. The fifth year of the Order of Probation is terminated. 
4. The Order of Probation as entered and as subsequently 
;!mended is hereby dissolved_ 
5 . As a consequence and pursuant to the Order entered 
December 16, 1988, the original Judgment and as it was subsequently 
i!mended is withheld, and the Clerk is appropriately directed to do 
:;0. 
6. Nothing herein will prevent the Court from considering 
°l:he Defendant I s record upon sentencing should he be found quil ty of 
any subsequent defense. 
DATED This Gf~~ day of October, 1992. 
~~~ 
Judge Robert Newhouse 
ORDER TERMINATING PROBATION, DISSOLVI NG ORDER OF PROBATION, AND 
:E:NTERING ORDER WITHHOLDING JUDGMENT - PAGE 2 
° .bn.10.8. 92.CB88.67 
000060 
